The text of the letter:

Sir,

Today the House of Lords will debate the Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill. We are opposed to this Bill and to any measure that seeks to legalise assisted suicide or euthanasia. We believe that all human life is sacred and God-given with a value that is inherent, not conditional. We urge legislators to withhold support for this Bill so as to ensure that British law continues to safeguard the principle that the intention to kill, or assist in the killing, of an innocent human being is wrong .

Compassion for the terminally ill is incumbent on all of us, but in that respect we believe that the Bill is misguided. Such a Bill cannot guarantee that a right to die would not, for society's most vulnerable, become a duty to die. Were such a law enacted, the elderly, lonely, sick or distressed would find themselves under pressure, real or imagined, to ask for an early death. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that economic pressures might not come to play a significant part in determining whether to treat or recommend assisted death.

Decisions about assisted suicide have acute implications for others - relatives, friends, colleagues, medical professionals and the wider community. As such, any change in the law would irrevocably change the delicate relationship of trust between patient and doctor and between citizen and society.

We particularly acknowledge the opposition to a change in the law from disability groups and from the majority in the medical profession, especially those committed to providing palliative care. In helping the terminally ill to face their fears, and by relieving their pain and suffering, palliative care workers are integral to securing the dignity of those nearing death. We believe, therefore, that properly funded and universally accessible palliative care services are essential for meeting the needs - material, emotional and spiritual - of those with terminal illnesses, and we urge the government to recognise the need for greater funding for palliative care.

The Most Reverend and Rt Hon Dr Rowan Williams, Archbishop of Canterbury

His Eminence Cardinal Cormac Murphy-O'Connor, Archbishop of Westminster

Sir Jonathan Sacks, the Chief Rabbi of the United Hebrew Congregations of the Commonwealth

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The following extracts are drawn from a speech given in the House of Lords debate on Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill by Archbishop Rowan Williams

May 12, 2006

These are extracts from the speech given by the Archbishop in the House of Lords debate on Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill. A full verbatim transcript will be made available as soon as possible.

...Opposition to the principle of this Bill is not confined to people of religious conviction, and it would be a lazy counter-argument to suggest that such opposition can be written off because it comes only from those committed to a world view that is not universally shared. It is worth remembering that the secular or 'enlightened' view of human autonomy assumed by many of this Bill's defenders is no less a particular world view, not a universal and self-evident truth.

...it is of course the case that the opposition of many of us is rooted in religious belief. This is not simply belief in an abstract principle of the sanctity of life. All religious believers hold that there is no stage of human life and no level of human experience that is intrinsically incapable of being lived through in some kind of trust and hope. They would say that to suggest otherwise is to limit the possibility of faithful and hopeful lives to those who are in charge of their circumstances, who enjoy a measure of control and success. The believer holds that even experiences of pain and helplessness can be passed through in a way that is meaningful, that communicates dignity and assurance.

... Certainly this is not universally held in our society. But if it is true, we should expect that ignoring it would bring disastrous risks; and whether or not Your Lordships agree with the fundamental principle from which those of us on these benches begin, it is not too difficult to spell out the nature of these risks and perhaps to find agreement there. Many others will want to elaborate on these and time is limited, so I shall confine myself to what I think are the most evident.

The first is this. Whether or not you believe that God enters into consideration, it remains true that to specify, even in the fairly broad terms of this Bill, conditions under which it would be both reasonable and legal to end your own life is to say that certain kinds of human life are not worth living. As soon as this is publicly granted, we put at risk the security of all those who experience such conditions. We risk, not too far down the road, a situation in which the onus of proof is on the vulnerable person to defend their right to live.

Secondly: we jeopardise the security of the vulnerable in another way by radically changing the relationship between patient and physician. The physician is not obliged to raise the possibility of assisted dying with a patient, according to the Bill; yet every patient will know that this is a statutory possibility, and there are many ways of exerting pressure on people, even without full intent. Further, if a patient wishing for assistance in dying is confronted with a physician who has conscientious scruples, he or she will be entitled to look around for an alternative; but how are we to guarantee that any such alternate could possibly give the advice and informed support that can only be provided by a doctor who has been involved long-term with a sufferer? Does not the possibility of an alternate actually deprive even the patient who wishes to end their life of the best in medical care?

Third, we must not conduct this debate in the abstract. We know all too well that the NHS is under severe financial pressure. We know too that, while the standard of palliative care in the UK is second to none, it is distributed with extraordinary unevenness. What incentive is there to broaden and improve that standard if there is a simpler and more cost-effective solution to these pressures? I recognise that this is far from the authentically compassionate intentions of this Bill's proposers; but a management and target-driven Health Service is not a very secure place (to appeal once again to that basic need for security) in which to open the door to anything that could distract from the need for continued excellence in palliative care. In this respect the much-discussed examples of Oregon and the Netherlands give no comfort whatsoever.

Finally, having mentioned palliative care, let me touch upon one more related matter. It is professionally acknowledged that the number of situations where physical discomfort or agony is consistently and unavoidably extreme is very small indeed, given our steady advances in pain control. Often what supporters of a change in the law are really arguing about is the mental and spiritual agony of the terminally sick.

Those of us who have spent long hours with such people, witnessing and absorbing such agonies, would be the last to dismiss the seriousness of this. Yet to legislate on the basis of states of mind is again to open a door into a general change of attitude about the legitimacy of ending one's life which has implications for everyone - for the suicidal teenager as well as the dying eighty-year-old. We return to my opening point: what will we be heard to be saying about the worthwhileness of life under certain conditions? Do we, by legally accommodating the mental suffering of some, debase the currency for all?

These are not trivial considerations; nor are they parochially religious ones. I believe they are pertinent for anyone who wishes to see our society remain committed to human dignity and liberty, and to the finest possible medical care for all our citizens.

Copyright Rowan Williams 2006

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