In point of fact, the two verses in the book of Leviticus (18:22 and 20:13) which deal with homosexuality are really quite clear, despite the efforts of some to call their clarity into question. Leviticus 18:22 and 20:13 absolutely forbid homosexual between males. The Rabbis, in the Sifra (Aharei Mot 9:8), also understand the Torah to forbid lesbianism. The Torah’s prohibitions, let it be clear, are against actions, like male homosexual , not against fantasies or attractions. The Torah and the Rabbis do not distinguish between types of homosexuals in any way, and anyone who wishes to read such an interpretation into the Torah and the Talmud is duty bound to provide convincing and compelling proof that he or she is not reading into the text something which is not there at all, as a way of allowing the text to lead to a desired but, in fact, halakhically indefensible conclusion. The Rabbis were well able to conceive of monogamous and loving relationships between members of the same sex, and I quote in my paper the texts that prove this beyond reasonable question. But their words cannot possibly be read to imply that such monogamous or loving gay relationships are in a different halakhic category than any other relationships between members of the same sex. The prohibition is clear and total.

Since I have long affirmed that the halakhic process legitimately may, and often must, take new knowledge into account as a datum in the decision-making process, I devoted a major part of my paper to an extensive analysis of the following question: Would any of the currently regnant theories about the etiology of homosexuality be persuasive enough to warrant, let alone demand, that the uncontested, long-standing halakhic precedent concerning homosexuality be overturned? The etiological theories were then, and remain today, the psychoanalytical, the biochemical/hormonal, and the sociobiological/genetic. Upon analysis of each of the theories, I concluded that not only is each insufficiently proved to warrant overturning biblical and rabbinic precedent on its account, but that even if it were absolutely proved, the overturning of precedent would not be warranted, and that a moral God could reasonably be understood to have imposed the prohibition justly. I ask your allowance to state these conclusions without offering a brief statement of my arguments about each of the theories. I do so because I have long ago learned through personal experience and suffering that a brief summary of a very complex argument cannot possibly do justice to a nuanced claim, and is actually likely to result in its distortion.

I am, first and foremost, a halakhist. And, in the final analysis, it is halakhah which is determinative both for me personally and for the Conservative Movement. But I must take advantage of my presence before you to make a number of points that will put my halakhic conclusions in a perspective that it is critical to me be understood.

First, halakhic decision-making is not a totally objective undertaking. Indeed, the same, it seems to me, is true of decision- making within all legal systems. I am prepared not only to admit, but to affirm, that poskim regularly approach a question before them with a predisposition to wishing to find a specific answer. There is nothing wrong with having such a predisposition, and poskim need feel no guilt at having one. But what distinguishes a good poseik from a poor one, in my opinion, is his ability to be sufficiently dispassionate in his evaluation of his own argument to be able to discern whether his predisposition has blinded him to its indefensibility. I, as many of you know, have been heavily involved in two very public halakhic debates within our Movement. I refer, of course, to the ordination of women and to the status of gay Jews. In the former I was heralded as a hero by many, and in the latter I was demonized, especially, though not exclusively, by many gay Jews.

I affirm to you today that I undertook my research and analysis of both issues with a predisposition to say yes. What distinguishes my two decisions on these subjects is very simple: about the ordination of women I believe that there is good halakhic justification for change in established precedent, and about the status of homosexuality there is not. I saw, and continue to see, no way to say yes to the latter without so vitiating the texts of the tradition that to do so would undermine the integrity of the very legal system which stands as the unassailable foundation of our Movement. I say today that had I felt that way about the halakhic justification justification of the ordination of women, I would have said no to it; and, if either I or someone else finds a cogent defense of a change in the halakhic status of homosexuality, I would gladly say yes. At this moment, however, I cannot find it, nor do I think anyone else has found it.

Second, our Movement is full of Jews who regularly violate halakhah in all sorts of ways. The vast majority of our members do not observe Shabbat in accordance with even the most liberal legal rulings of the Law Committee. The vast majority do not come close to observing the laws of kashrut. Few perceive daily prayer as legal requirement that compels them. Many probably engage in business practices that halakhah might well frown upon. In none of these cases do I, or anyone else, ever say about these Jews that they are wicked or evil. Gay Jews who behave in certain ways also violate halakhah, but they are no more wicked or evil than are Sabbath desecrators and I do not perceive them any differently in that regard than I perceive Sabbath desecrators. I suspect that there are many who must believe that I could not possibly have even a working relationship with gay Jews, let alone a friendship and warm feelings. They are wrong, and absolutely so. I find it no more difficult to have a strong and warm relationship with a gay Jew than I do to have a similar relationship with a Jew who does not keep kosher or does not fulfill the laws of prayer.

Third, Jewish law is very different from American law in one critically important way. Halakhah is a religious legal system, purporting to reflect what God demands of the Jewish people; American law is secular, assiduously avoiding any claim whatsoever that its demands have or lack Divine sanction. As an American, I might legitimately claim that the law ought and can have nothing to say about my private and personal behavior with any other consenting adult. As a Jew, I cannot reasonably make a parallel claim about halakhah. It is untenable, virtually by definition, to claim that God cannot legitimately command me about matters which are private and personal, even with a consenting adult. Indeed, as Jews we know that God does command us about personal and private matters like the food we eat, the clothes we wear, and our sexual relations with our spouses.

From this critical distinction it follows that there is no inconsistency whatsoever in claiming that gay people in America must have all the same civil rights as all other Americans, on the one hand, and affirming that homosexual behavior is halakhically forbidden and ought not be engaged in, on the other. It is no different than affirming that eating treif carries with it no negative judgment from the perspective of a secular legal system, while it does from the perspective of halakhah. There seem to me to be many people who think that if one continues to affirm halakhic precedents about homosexuality, he or she cannot possibly believe that gay people deserve and are entitled to equal protection of the laws and full equality of civil rights within the secular legal system under which we live as Americans. Even more, whatever rights, privileges and honors we agree to allow within the Jewish community to Jews who violate other central elements of halakhah must be granted no less to gay Jews. Their violation of halakhah is not of a different or more severe nature than many of the halakhic violations which are, regrettably, so common among us Conservative Jews, nor, therefore, should their treatment by us as a Movement be any different.

Fourth, the unambiguous clarity of my halakhic stance has often led people to assume incorrectly my stance on some very important matters. Therefore, I wish to make several things as unambiguously clear as my halakhic stance is. Whatever the etiology of homosexuality might be, homosexuals do not make a conscious and knowing choice to be homosexuals. Indeed, most probably fight their own first conscious inklings that they are not heterosexual, and may do so for years, causing great personal anguish and torment. Halakhically committed gay Jews are called upon by the halakhic system to make a sacrifice far more demanding, difficult, and onerous than what is almost ever demanded of other Jews. The halakhic system, to the best of my ability to understand it, demands of gay Jews to be celibate, and that is a demand made only of agunot in addition to them. The halakhic system does not and cannot command gay Jews not to have homosexual attractions, but it does insist that they not act on these attractions.

Let nobody in this room think for one minute that I believe it is easy to comply with this demand. Halakhah also demands of heterosexual Jews that they restrict their sexual relations to their spouses, yet we exhibit understanding of the inability of many heterosexual Jews to wait until marriage to engage in sexual relations or even their inability to be forever loyal to their spouses when they are married. Halakhah does not condone these violations of its dictates, but we understand human frailty. If that is so for people who are not at all consigned to a life of celibacy, how much more so must we be understanding when the behavior of gay Jews does not live up to halakhic demands. They, after all, are consigned to a life of celibacy. If we praise the choice of heterosexual Jews to restrict their non-marital relations to monogamous relationships because we consider that a more moral choice than heterosexual promiscuity; so, too, must we praise the choice of homosexual Jews to restrict their relations to monogamous relationships because we consider that a more moral choice than homosexual promiscuity. But, in both cases, our praise of a more moral choice should be carefully worded and expressed lest it be misunderstood to imply halakhic acceptance, because it does not, in either case.

And, finally, I would like to say a word or two about treatment. It is the popular wisdom in the world that homosexuality cannot be successfully or even moderately successfully treated, and perhaps that is true. I do know that there are organizations and schools of therapy which claim to have at least some, and sometimes great, success. I don’t know where the truth lies, or whether there is only one possible truth about this matter, but this much I wish to say. It is yet within my not so distant memory that the western medical world rejected such types of treatment as acupuncture and herbal remedies, yet these are now part of the normal arsenal of medical treatments. I urge halakhically committed gay Jews not to reject the possibility that the severity of the halakhic demand of celibacy might be somewhat or significantly mitigated by some modes of therapy and treatment. Since the halakhic prohibition stands irrespective of whether there is treatment possible or not, there is little to be lost in giving a chance to treatment for which claims of marked success are made and attested.

I end with a double plea. I plead with gay Jews to recognize that an inability to legitimate homosexuality halakhically makes no negative claim whatsoever about the humanity, sanctity, worth, and dignity of homosexuals. And I plead with straight Jews to exhibit much greater understanding of the personal plight, especially the personal halakhic plight, of gay Jews, and to be ever mindful that an inability to legitimate homosexuality halakhically makes no negative claim whatsoever about the humanity, sanctity, worth, and dignity of homosexuals.

Rabbi Roth is Professor of Talmud at the Jewish Theological Seminary.